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Cable TV, Indecency and the Court
by Jonathan Weinberg*
On the next-to-last day of the 1995 Term, the Supreme Court issued
its decision in Denver Area Educational Tele-Communications Consor-
tium v. FCC.' The Court struck down two provisions of the Cable
Television Protection and Competition Act of 1992.2 The first concerned
cable systems' "public access" channels. Under the Cable Communica-
tions Policy Act of 1984,3 local franchise authorities may require cable
operators to dedicate certain channels to programming created by
members of the community; the cable operators may not exercise
editorial control over any programming on those channels.4 The 1992
law, as implemented by the FCC, created an exception to that no-
censorship rule: it authorized cable operators to ban any programming
on public access channels that depicted or described "sexual or excretory
activities or organs in a patently offensive manner."5 The Justices found
that that exception violated the First Amendment. The Court upheld a
similar provision authorizing cable operators to ban such programming
from leased access channels,' but struck down language requiring cable
* Associate Professor, Wayne State University Law School. Jessica Litman's
comments greatly improved this Article.
Copyright © 1997 by Jonathan Weinberg.
1. 116 S. Ct. 2374 (1996).
2. Pub. L. No. 102-385, 106 Stat. 1460 (1992)[hereinafter the 1992 Act].
3. Pub. L. 98-549, 98 Stat. 2782 (1984), [hereinafter the 1984 Act].
4. Id. § 2 at 2782 (codified in relevant part at 47 U.S.C. § 531(e)).
5. The 1992 Act § 10(c) at 1486 (codified at note after 47 U.S.C. § 531). Section 10(c)
of the 1992 Act directed the FCC to promulgate regulations enabling cable operators to ban
from public access channels "any programming which contains obscene material, sexually
explicit conduct, or material soliciting or promoting unlawful conduct." A later statutory
amendment provided that "a cable operator may refuse to transmit any public access
program or portion of a public access program which contains obscenity, indecency, or
nudity." Pub. L. 104-104, 110 Stat. 137 § 506(a) (1996) (codified in relevant part at 47
U.S.C. § 531(e)). The FCC promulgated regulations authorizing cable operators to bar from
public access channels "any programming which contains nudity, obscene.., or indecent
material ... , or material soliciting or promoting unlawful conduct." 47 C.F.R. § 76.702.
It defined "indecent material" to include "any programming that describes or depicts sexual
or excretory activities or organs in a patently offensive manner as measured by
contemporary community standards for the cable medium." Id. (incorporating definition
id. § 76.701(g)). It defined "material soliciting or promoting unlawful conduct" to mean
"material that is otherwise proscribed by law." Id.
6. The 1984 Cable Act required cable operators to set aside certain channels "for
commercial use by persons unaffiliated with the operator," on a common-carrier basis.
Cable operators were forbidden to "exercise any editorial control over any video
programming provided" on leased-access channels. There was one exception, though: Cable
operators were directed not to provide service if the programming "in the judgment of the
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operators that did carry such programming on leased channels to
segregate it on a single channel and to block viewing of that channel
except by subscribers who had requested access in writing.7
The Court did not speak with a single voice: the Justices wrote six
separate opinions in support of four different results.8 The opinions are
extraordinary. In the D.C. Circuit, the judges had agonized over the
question whether a statute merely authorizing cable operators not to
carry certain speech could amount to "state action" implicating the First
Amendment.9 But none of the Justices thought that question worth more
than a paragraph. Each of them, rather, addressed state action concerns
implicitly, as part of his First Amendment discussion. The plurality's
treatment of state action, on close analysis, is the hardest to explain.
The tone of the plurality opinion, moreover, is curious. The opinion
explicitly declined to address doctrinal issues, such as public-forum law,
that at first blush seemed unavoidable. Given the changing law,
technology and industrial structure of telecommunications, Justice
Breyer explained, it would be inappropriate to even consider those
matters. ° To do so would divest the Court of necessary flexibility,
franchising authority is obscene, or is in conflict with community standards in that it is
lewd, lascivious, filthy, or indecent or is otherwise unprotected by the Constitution of the
United States." The 1984 Act §2 at 2782 (codified in relevant part at 47 U.S.C. § 532(c)(2))
(italics added).
The 1984 Act gave franchising authorities, not cable operators, authority to restrict
indecent programming on leased channels. The 1992 Act changed that, adding this
language: "This subsection shall permit a cable operator to enforce prospectively a written
and published policy of prohibiting programming that the cable operator reasonably
believes describes or depicts sexual or excretory activities or organs in a patently offensive
manner as measured by contemporary community standards." The 1992 Act § 10(aX2)
(codified at 47 U.S.C. § 532(h)). In a later amendment, Congress added that "a cable
operator may refuse to transmit any leased access program or portion of a leased access
program which contains obscenity, indecency, or nudity." Pub. L. 104-104, § 506(b), 110
Stat. 137 (1996), (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 532(c)(2)).
The FCC accordingly promulgated regulations allowing a system operator to bar from
leased channels programming it "reasonably believes describes or depicts sexual or
excretory activities or organs in a patently offensive manner as measured by contemporary
community standards," 47 C.F.R- § 76.701(a), and programming that it "reasonably believes
contains obscenity, indecency, or nudity," id. § 76.701(i).
7. The 1992 Act § 10(b) at 1486 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 532(j); 47 C.F.R. §
76.701(b)&(c)).
8. See 116 S.Ct. at 2380 (Breyer, J.) (plurality opinion); id. at 2398 (Stevens, J.,
concurring); id. at 2401 (Souter, J., concurring); id. at 2403 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part); id. at 2404 (Kennedy, J., joined by Ginsburg, J., concurring in part,
concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part); id. at 2419 (Thomas, J., joined
by Rehnquist, C.J., and Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting).
9. Alliance for Community Media v. FCC, 10 F.3d 812 (D.C. Cir. 1993), vacated, 15
F.3d 186 (D.C. Cir. 1994), en banc, 56 F.3d 105 (D.C. Cir. 1995), rev'd sub nom. Denver
Area Educ. Tele-Communications Consortium v. FCC, 116 S.Ct. 2374 (1996).
10. See Denver Area, 116 S.Ct. at 2384-85.
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locking it into rigid "categorical" approaches." Instead, he continued,
it would be better to engage in a "contextual" assessment.1 2 The
plurality, thus, forswore any analysis based on abstract First Amend-
ment doctrine.
An initial answer to the riddles of the plurality opinion can be found
in FCC v. Pacifica Foundation13 (in which the Court upheld indecency
regulation of over-the-air TV and radio). Pacifica is the lodestone of the
plurality opinion both doctrinally and jurisprudentially. It helps explain
both the plurality's state action analysis and its approach to the First
Amendment. In many ways, though, the centrality of Pacifica is the most
surprising thing about the Denver Area plurality opinion. As a lower-
court judge had confidently written less than three weeks earlier, "[t]ime
has not been kind to the Pacifica decision." 4 In Denver Area, a Su-
preme Court plurality revived Pacifica's contextual style, and rehabilitat-
ed the case as a model for regulation of cable television. As a result,
Pacifica's reasoning and jurisprudential approach, thought by many to
have been quietly interred, are back. Justice Breyer wrote in the Denver
Area plurality opinion that he was approaching the case contextually,
setting aside abstract doctrine, because of "the changes taking place in
the law, the technology, and the industrial structure." 5 The deeper
message of the plurality opinion, though, is that no matter how
technology evolves, Pacifica's contextual approach will continue to guide
regulation of media that feel like television.
In Part I of this Article, I will offer some background, setting the
Denver Area case in perspective. In Part II, I will describe the Denver
Area opinions, explore the apparent dematerialization of state action
analysis from the Justices' chambers, and investigate the plurality's
rejection of First Amendment rules. In Part III, I will suggest that
Pacifica provides the answers to the problems set out above. I will try to
explain how Pacifica - one of the Court's most reviled cases, troubling
"[miost people with any first amendment bones in their bodies"" -
made such a comeback. 17
11. Id. at 2384.
12. Id. at 2388.
13. 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
14. ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 875 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (opinion of Dalzell, J.).
15. 116 S. Ct. at 2385.
16. STEVEN H. SHIFFRIN, THE FIRsT AMENDMENT, DEMOCRACY AND ROMANCE 80
(1990).
17. For a different, excellent analysis of Denver Area, which became available to me
as this Article was going to press, see Monroe Price & John Duffy, Technological Change
and Doctrinal Persistence: Telecommunications Reform in Congress and the Court, 97
COLUM. L. REV._ (1997) (forthcoming May 1997).
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I. INDECENCY ON CABLE
The roots of the Denver Area controversy lie in the 1960s, when local
franchising authorities first required cable operators to provide their
customers with a channel on which citizens could distribute their own
programming to the community.' Cities came to require these "public
access" channels routinely, as a condition of the cable operator's
franchise. In 1972, the FCC sought to federalize access requirements: It
published a rule requiring, among other things, that each cable system
in the country's top 100 markets provide "one dedicated, noncommercial
public access channel available without charge at all times on a first-
come, first-served nondiscriminatory basis."'9  That channel was
supposed to provide a "practical opportunity to participate in community
dialogue through a mass medium. 2 ° Cable systems in the same
markets were also required to make channel capacity available for leased
access.2 The Commission pre-empted all state and local regulation of
public access channels, except that franchising authorities in the
smallest markets (where the FCC rule didn't apply) could require such
channels if they chose.22
The Commission emphasized that cable operators were not to permit
the distribution of obscene or indecent programming on public-access or
leased channels. 23 Every cable operator had the obligation to see that
such material was not broadcast.' The Commission recognized that, as
a practical matter, cable operators could not monitor all access program-
ming in advance. But once an operator was put on notice that a
18. See JOHN THORNE ET AL., FEDERAL BROADBAND LAW § 5.5.5, at 327 (1995).
19. Access to and Use of Nonbroadcast Channels, 36 F.C.C.2d 143, 190 (1972). The
top 100 markets contained 90% of the nation's television households. See VINCENT MOSCO,
BROADCASTING IN THE UNITED STATES: INNOVATIVE CHALLENGE AND ORGANIZATIONAL
CONTROL 95 (1979).
20. Access to and Use of Nonbroadcast Channels, 36 F.C.C.2d 143, 190-91 (1972).
21. See id. at 191-92. The Commission directed cable operators in the relevant
markets to promulgate rules providing for "non-discriminatory access on a first-come, first-
served basis with the appropriate rate schedule specified." It contemplated that "there will
be experimentation, with some channels used entirely for advertising, some following the
pattern of commercial broadcasts, and others that of [origination cablecasting]," and
pledged to monitor developments. Id. at 195.
22. Id. at 193-94. If a franchising authority in such a market did require an access
channel, that channel would be governed by FCC rules. Id. at 197-98.
The Commission reassessed its access rules a few years later, concluding that they
should apply to systems with at least 3500 subscribers, without regard to the size of the
markets in which they were found, and softening their application to cable systems with
insufficient channel capacity. Cable Television Channel Capacity and Access Channel
Requirements, 59 F.C.C.2d 294, 297 (1976), rev'd sub nom. Midwest Video Corp. v. FCC,
571 F.2d 1025 (8th Cir. 1978), affd, 440 U.S. 689 (1979).
23. 36 F.C.C.2d at 193-94, 197-98.
24. See Clarification of Section 76.256, 59 F.C.C.2d 984 (1976).
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particular programmer might disseminate questionable material, it was
obligated to "take appropriate steps" to ensure that that programmer
stayed within the rules.25
That requirement did not last long: the D.C. Circuit found that it
amounted to an unconstitutional prior restraint.2" On remand, the
agency agreed that "a rule which requires the cable system to censor
programming on a channel set aside as a public forum, to which the
programmer has a right of access by virtue of local, state or federal law,
would impose a system of prior restraint in violation of" the First
Amendment.2 7 It repealed its old rules.28 At about the same time, the
Supreme Court held that the FCC's overall access-channel requirement
was invalid, because beyond the agency's statutory authority.29 The
Commission repealed those rules as well. 30
In the early 1980s, thus, while local franchising authorities commonly
required cable operators to provide public access channels, federal law
did not address public access at all. That changed with the passage of
the Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984.31 That statute, a hard-
negotiated compromise between cable and local-government lobbyists,
formalized the local franchising process. It provided explicitly that
franchising authorities could require public access channels, and
required that "a cable operator shall not exercise any editorial control
25. Id. at 985. The agency added:
Obviously, there will be situations where a program is not proscribed by our rule
but, in the opinion of the cable operator, might prove distasteful to some subscribers.
We, of course, cannot and should not attempt to regulate such situations. There is
no constitutional safeguard against unpleasantness. [But] as a matter of taste and
common sense it would be appropriate for such programming to be cablecast at hours
that would tend to minimize its exposure to children. Our rules do not require such
scheduling, but.., neither do they prohibit it.
Id.
26. American Civil Liberties Union v. FCC, No. 76-1695 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 26, 1977); see
also FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689, 693 n.4 (1979); Midwest Video Corp. v.
FCC, 571 F.2d 1025, 1034 n.19, 1056-57 (8th Cir. 1978), affd, 440 U.S. 689 (1979); Cable
Television Channel Capacity and Access Channel Requirements, 83 F.C.C.2d 147, 148 n.
1 (1980).
27. Cable Television Channel Capacity and Access Channel Requirements, 87
F.C.C.2d 40, 42 (1981).
28. Cable Television Channel Capacity and Access Channel Requirements, 83
F.C.C.2d 147 (1980). The FCC continued to prohibit cable operators from themselves
producing "indecent" programming. See Cable Television Channel Capacity and Access
Channel Requirements, 87 F.C.C.2d 40 (1981). The agency deleted that rule in 1985 as
regulatory deadwood, on the ground that Congress had adequately addressed obscene and
indecent programming in the Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984. Implementation
of the Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, 50 Fed. Reg. 18637, 18656 (1985).
29. FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689 (1979).
30. Cable Television Channel Capacity and Access Channel Requirements, 83
F.C.C.2d 147 (1980).
31. The 1984 Act, Pub. L. No. 98-549, 98 Stat. 2779 (1984).
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over any public . . . use of channel capacity" on such a channel.32 The
House Report described those channels as "the video equivalent of the
speaker's soap box or the electronic parallel to the printed leaflet."3 3
The statute's rule of programming freedom incorporated just one
exception: a franchising authority could exempt from the common-
carriage obligation programming that was "obscene or otherwise
unprotected by the Constitution of the United States."4
The statute also required cable systems to offer leased access channels
(although its failure to provide meaningful guidance as to the rates cable
operators could charge for access left the provision largely ineffective).35
It indicated that programming was not entitled to leased access if "in the
judgment of the franchising authority [it] is obscene, or is in conflict with
community standards in that it is lewd, lascivious, filthy or indecent or
is otherwise unprotected by the Constitution of the United States.""
When Congress was considering a major revision of the cable
television laws in 1992,37 Senator Helms and others rose to complain
that the 1984 law was inadequate to keep "filthy," "perverted and
disgusting" sexually-explicit programming off leased-access channels.'
According to a letter Senator Helms inserted in the Congressional
Record, existing law was insufficient because it left the power to exclude
sexually explicit programming in the hands of franchising authorities.39
Local authorities' constitutional power to exclude particular leased-access
providers was questionable,' and in any event "very few if any"
franchising authorities were inclined to exercise that power.4 According
to Senator Fowler, public-access channels were being abused just as
badly: they were being used "to basically solicit prostitution."42 Senators
Helms and Fowler proposed, and the Senate adopted without dissent,
three floor amendments designed to address these problems.
32. Id. § 2 at 2782 (codified in relevant part at 47 U.S.C. § 531(e)).
33. H. Rep. No. 934, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. at 30 (1984).
34. The 1984 Act § 2 at 2790 (codified in relevant part at 47 U.S.C. § 544(d)(1)).
35. See THOMAS G. KRATENMAKER, TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAw AND POLICY 321
(1994); see also Time Warner Entertainment Co. v. F.C.C., 93 F.3d 957, 967-70 (D.C. Cir.
1996). In the 1992 Cable Consumer Protection and Competition Act, Congress directed the
FCC to promulgate regulations ensuring that cable systems price leased access at
affordable levels. Those new regulations have also been criticized as ineffective, and the
FCC is re-examining them. See Cable Rate Regulation (Reconsideration of Commercial
Leased Access Requirements), 2 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 989 (Mar. 29, 1996).
36. The 1984 Act § 2 at 2785 (codified in relevant part at 47 U.S.C. § 532(h)).
37. The 1992 Act, Pub. L. 102-385, 106 Stat. 1460 (1992).
38. 138 CONG. REC. S646 (daily ed. Jan. 30, 1992) (comments of Sen. Helms).
39. Id. at S647-S648 (letter from Robert Peters, attorney, Morality in Media).
40. Id. (citing City of Paducah v. Investment Entertainment, Inc., 791 F.2d 463 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 915 (1986), and Midwest Video Corp. v. FCC, 571 F.2d 1025,
1056-57 (8th Cir. 1978), affd, 440 U.S. 689 (1979)).
41. Id. at S648.
42. Id. at S649 (comments of Sen. Fowler).
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Two of the amendments were proposed by Senator Helms. The first,
concerning leased-access channels, empowered cable operators "to enforce
prospectively a written and published policy of prohibiting programming
that the cable operator reasonably believes describes or depicts sexual or
excretory activities or organs in a patently offensive manner as measured
by contemporary community standards."' To the extent cable operators
chose to allow indecent programming on leased-access channels, the
amendment required them to place that programming on a single
channel and block that channel unless a subscriber requested access in
writing." This became sections 10(a) and (b) of the 1992 Act.45
On the floor of the Senate, Senator Helms explained that the new
language was constitutionally unproblematic. The first provision -
allowing cable operators to exclude sexually explicit speech - was
constitutional because it did not require the cable systems to take any
action. It merely "allow[ed] a private company to make independent
decisions to exclude certain objectionable material"; there was no
government action and hence no censorship.46 The second provision -
requiring cable operators to segregate and block indecent programming
- merely tracked federal dial-a-porn regulation.47
Senator Helms' second amendment involved 47 U.S.C. § 558, which
exempted cable operators from civil or criminal liability for material
carried on public-access or leased-access channels. The 1984 law, Helms
said, had allowed a cable company to carry the Playboy channel on a
leased-access channel, free from worries that it could be prosecuted for
obscenity." Under the new amendment - which became section 10(d)
of the 1992 Act - cable systems' immunity was lifted for obscene
material. A cable operator could permit sexually explicit programming
on a leased-access or public access channel only at the risk of itself being
prosecuted on obscenity charges.4 9
Senator Fowler's amendment directed the FCC to promulgate
regulations empowering cable operators to exclude "obscene material,
sexually explicit conduct or material soliciting or promoting unlawful
43. Id. at S646.
44. Id.
45. The 1992 Act § 10(a) & (b) at 1486 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 532(j) & (h)).
46. 138 CONG. REc. S646 (daily ed. Jan. 30, 1992) (comments of Sen. Helms).
47. Id. at S646-S647. Current law requires dial-a-porn providers to use credit card
authorization, access codes or scrambling in order to limit access to consenting adults over
18. Further, if the telephone company chooses to provide billing and collection services for
a dial-a-porn provider, it may not provide any access except to homes that have previously
requested, in writing, that it do so. See 47 C.F.R. § 64.201; Dial Info. Serv. Corp. v.
Thornburgh, 938 F.2d 1535 (2d Cir. 1991); Information Providers' Coalition v. FCC, 928
F.2d 866 (9th Cir. 1991).
48. 138 Cong. Rec. at S652.
49. The 1992 Act § 10(d) at 1486 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 558).
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conduct" from public-access channels."0 Like Senator Helms's amend-
ments, it passed without dissent; it became section 10(c) of the 1992
Act.5 ' The larger statute became law on October 5, 1992.
Programmers and viewers' organizations sought review of these
provisions in court. A panel of the D.C. Circuit struck down sections
10(a) and (c) - the provisions allowing cable systems to exclude indecent
material from leased-access and public-access channels - as unconstitu-
tional.5 2 The panel found that decisions by cable operators denying
carriage to sexually explicit programming, pursuant to the 1992
statutory amendments, should be deemed "state action," chargeable to
the government.5 " The statute as amended required cable operators to
carry all speech on access channels except that which the government
wanted to suppress, and empowered cable operators to reject exactly -
and only - that speech the government wished to eliminate. Both the
goal of the statutory amendments and their plain effect was to limit the
transmission of indecent material. Under Supreme Court authority
including Reitman v. Mulkey,' the panel concluded, the government
was responsible for any cable system choices barring indecent program-
ming; the statute had created "a form of sophisticated discrimination
whereby the [governent]... harness[ed] the energies of private groups
to do indirectly" what it could not constitutionally do itself.5 5 Once the
case was seen as one in which the government (indirectly) imposed
blanket bans on indecent speech on access channels, it was plain that the
statute was unconstitutional; the government's action failed the test of
narrow tailoring appropriate for content-based regulation."
50. 138 Cong. Rec. at S649. In proscribing material promoting "unlawful conduct,"
Sen. Fowler was apparently referring to prostitution. The FCC implementing regulations
translate "material soliciting or promoting unlawful conduct" as "material that is otherwise
proscribed by law." 47 C.F.R. § 76.702.
51. The 1992 Act § 10(c) at 1486 (codified at note after 47 U.S.C. § 531).
52. Alliance for Community Media v. FCC, 10 F.3d 812 (D.C. Cir. 1993), vacated, 15
F.3d 186 (D.C. Cir. 1994), en banc, 56 F.3d 105 (D.C. Cir. 1995), rev'd sub nom Denver Area
Educ.Tele-Communications Consortium v. FCC, 116 S. Ct. 2374 (1996).
53. Id. at 818-22.
54. 387 U.S. 369 (1967). In Reitman, the Court struck down a California state
constitutional amendment prohibiting the state from denying the "right of any person [to]
decline to sell, lease or rent [property] to such person or persons as he, in his absolute
discretion, chooses." It was one thing, the Court said, merely to repeal state fair housing
laws, and another to enshrine a right to racial discrimination in the State's basic charter.
See id. at 374-77.
55. 10 F.3d at 822 (quoting Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. at 383 (Douglas, J.,
concurring)).
56. The statute, in those circumstances, could be justified only if it were the least
restrictive means of furthering the government's interest. It was uncontested, though, that
"a total ban on indecent programming is not the least restrictive alternative." Id. at 823.
The court remanded so that the FCC could consider how - and whether - it could
implement § 10(b) of the 1992 Act in light of the court's ruling. Id. at 824-31.
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Sitting en banc, the D.C. Circuit took the opposite view.5 7 Judge
Randolph, writing for the majority, explained that any actions taken by
cable operators to exclude indecent programming from access channels,
in the wake of the 1992 Act, should not be attributable to the govern-
ment. The statute neither coerced nor encouraged; it merely gave cable
operators the choice whether to carry particular programming. In
transferring editorial discretion from access programmers to cable
operators - who, after all, were the owners of the systems in question
- the 1992 amendments gave rise to no "state action" implicating the
First Amendment."8 As for the segregate-and-block requirement of
section 10(b), it was the least restrictive means of furthering the govern-
ment's compelling interest in protecting the physical and psychological
well-being of minors.59
The Supreme Court granted cert.
II. DENVER AREA
I will begin this section by sketching the approaches of the three
principal opinion-writers in the Denver Area case - Justices Breyer,
Kennedy and Thomas.6 ° Their opinions display two crucial themes. The
57. 56 F.3d 105 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
58. The majority cited Flagg Brothers, Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978), for the
proposition that the mere passage of a statute authorizing private action does not itself
constitute state action sufficient to trigger constitutional analysis. 56 F.3d at 113. The
statute's leased-access and public-access provisions, the majority continued, did impose
common-carrier obligations on cable operators. But that fact "does not render [their]
facilities 'public forums' in the First Amendment sense and does not transform [their]
discretionary carriage decisions into decisions of the government." Id. at 123.
59. Id. at 123-25.
60. I will not discuss the less substantial opinions of Justices Stevens, O'Connor, and
Souter. Justices Stevens and Souter each wrote short concurring opinions, and Justice
O'Connor a short opinion dissenting in part. The most interesting of these is Justice
Souter's. Souter defended Justice Breyer's contextual approach, notwithstanding that
"First Amendment values generally are well-served by" categorical rules, on the ground
that the technology of electronic communications was moving too fast for the Court "to risk
the finality of precision." 116 S. Ct. at 2403 (Souter, J., concurring). "[A]s broadcast, cable
and the cyber-technology of the Internet and the World Wide Web approach the day of
using a common receiver, we can hardly assume that standards for judging the regulation
of one of them will not have immense, but now unknown and unknowable, effects on the
others." Id. at 2402.
Justice Stevens explained that in his view the leased-access provision was permissible,
because it constituted a reasonable, viewpoint-neutral limitation on a novel access right
created by the federal government. The public-access limitation, by contrast, would allow
"federally authorized private censors" to override local governments' decisions about
carriage "on channels of [the local governments'] own creation." Id. at 2400 (Stevens, J.,
concurring). Justice O'Connor, by contrast, urged that the public-access and leased-access
provisions were indistinguishable, and should both be upheld. Id. at 2403 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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first is the apparent disappearance of state action analysis. The Justices
expended remarkably few words on state action, notwithstanding its
centrality to the judges below. With one insignificant exception, none of
the Denver Area opinions even mentions any of the decisions in the
Court's long line of "state action" precedent. 61 Rather, for the most part,
they address the issue by indirection. Justice Breyer's opinion for the
plurality presents an especially puzzling example of vanishing state
action analysis; I will attempt to explain that disappearance in section
III.
The second theme relates to the tension between categorization and
balancing as modes of constitutional analysis. One can identify two
recurrent styles of constitutional decision making, each a polar opposite
of the other.62 In the first, judges resolve legal questions through the
application of hard-edged, black-letter rules that determine the
pigeonhole into which each case will be sorted; once that pigeonhole has
been determined, analysis is largely at an end. This style is sometimes
referred to as categorization;' the black-letter rules central to it are
commonly referred to, reasonably enough, as rules." In the second
mode, judges resolve legal questions through the case-by-case, ad hoc,
contextual weighing of the policy considerations that bring themselves
to bear on the particular facts of the particular case. This style, in
constitutional analysis, is referred to as particularism" or balancing.6 6
61. The plurality cites Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. Democratic Natl Comm., 412
U.S. 94 (1973) (in which some of the Justices addressed the question whether a broadcaster
policy of refusing to accept editorial advertising should be attributable to the state), but
only as part of a string of cases standing for the proposition that the Court's First
Amendment broadcasting cases "have dealt with government efforts to restrict, not... to
... maintain, a broadcaster's freedom to pick and choose programming." 116 S. Ct. at
2383.
Justice Kennedy, in his three-sentence state action discussion, awards a "cf.* cite to
Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969), an equal protection case that does not explicitly
phrase its analysis in state action terms. 116 S. Ct. at 2405.
62. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Post-Liberal Judging: The Roles of Categorization and
Balancing, 63 U. CoLO. L. REV. 293 (1992) [hereinafter, Sullivan, Post-Liberal Judging]; see
also Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Rules, 83 CAL. L. REv. 953 (1995). Indeed, one can
identify these models in the resolution of any legal question. In that larger arena,
essentially the same dichotomy is often referred to as the distinction between "rules" and
"standards." See Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE
L.J. 557 (1992); Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89
HARV. L. REV. 1685, 1685, 1698-89 (1976); Pierre Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA
L. REV. 379, 379-80, 383-98 (1985); Kathleen Sullivan, The Supreme Court, 1991 Term -
Forward: The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REv. 22, 58-59 (1992);
Jonathan Weinberg, Broadcasting and Speech, 81 CAL. L. REV. 1101, 1167-69 (1993).
63. See, e.g., Sullivan, Post-Liberal Judging, supra note 62, at 293-94.
64. See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, Rules and the Rule of Law, 14 HARV. J. L. & PUB.
POL'Y 645 (1991); Sunstein, supra note 62.
65. See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, Harry Kalven and the Perils of Particularism, 56 U.
Cin. L. REv. 397 (1989).
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The debate between categorization and balancing is a long-standing one
in First Amendment thought.67 In this respect, too, though, Justice
Breyer's opinion presents a puzzle.
A. WHAT THEY SAID
1. Justice Breyer
Justice Breyer's plurality opinion6" begins by announcing that the
case is not really about "state action" at all.
Although the [D.C. Circuit] said that it found no "state action," it could not
have meant that phrase literally, for, of course, petitioners attack (as
"abridg[ing] speech") a congressional statute - which, by definition, is an
Act of "Congress." More likely, the court viewed this statute's "permissive"
provisions as not themselves restricting speech, but, rather, as simply
reaffirming the authority to pick and choose programming that a private
entity, say, a private broadcaster, would have had in the absence of
intervention by any federal, or local, governmental entity.
69
Breyer recognized that issues associated with the D.C. Circuit's state
action concerns made the case problematic. "[T]he First Amendment, the
terms of which apply to governmental action, ordinarily does not itself
throw into constitutional doubt the decisions of private citizens to permit,
or to restrict, speech."7" If the Court upheld petitioners' claims, vindicat-
ing petitioners' autonomy as First Amendment speakers, it necessarily
would limit the autonomy of cable-system operators to engage in their
own First Amendment activity. He continued by describing arguments
petitioners advanced in favor of finding state action: cable operators have
monopoly power, allowing them to engage in private censorship if
unchecked; they are extraordinarily involved with government; and, as
66. See, e.g., Sullivan, Post-Liberal Judging, supra note 62, at 293-94. "Particularism"
and "balancing" refer to different facets of this form of analysis. Particularism refers to the
fact that the decision maker operates contextually, focusing on the particular facts of the
case rather than on larger, abstract rules. Balancing refers to the fact that the decision
maker seeks to do justice by weighing the competing policy considerations appearing on the
facts of the given case.
67. See, e.g.,Laurent B. Frantz, The First Amendment in the Balance, 71 YALE. L.J.
1424 (1962); Wallace Mendelson, On the Meaning of the First Amendment: Absolutes in the
Balance, 50 CAL. L. REv. 821 (1962); Laurent B. Franz, Is the First Amendment Law? A
Reply to Professor Mendelson, 51 CAL. L. REv. 729 (1963).
68. Joined by Justices Stevens and Souter, and in part by Justice O'Connor.
69. Denver Area Educ. Telecom. Consortium v. FCC, 116 S.Ct. 2374, 2382-83 (1996)
(citation omitted).
70. Id. at 2383.
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a realistic matter, their First Amendment interests as editors are
weak."
After setting out these competing arguments, though, Justice Breyer
set aside the issue, and turned to First Amendment analysis. The
overriding question, he explained, was whether the statute's provisions
"properly address[] an extremely important problem, without imposing,
in light of the relevant interests, an unnecessarily great restriction on
speech."72 He explained that he would not address a variety of doctrinal
questions. Justice Kennedy, for example, argued that public-access
channels were First Amendment public forums. Breyer declared it
"unnecessary, indeed, unwise, for us definitively to decide whether or
how" the public forum doctrine applied.73 Rather, the plurality could
decide the case "more narrowly."74 First Amendment doctrines such as
those relied on by Justice Kennedy provided mere "imprecise analogies";
it was better to seek to provide "a more contextual assessment,
consistent with our First Amendment tradition, of assessing whether
Congress carefully and appropriately addressed a serious problem."7 5
To aid that analysis, Breyer explained, he would look to the "essence"
of the Court's First Amendment cases.76 That "essence," he continued,
was that government has power "to address the most serious prob-
lems."77 (He cited Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire," Young v. American
Mini-Theatres79 and FCC v. Pacifica Foundation,° setting up the
hard-to-avoid inference that the nation's "most serious problems" over
the history of the First Amendment have been insults, dirty movies and
four-letter words.) Speech regulation must be "appropriately tailored to
resolve those problems without imposing an unnecessarily great
restriction on speech."8' Government "may not regulate speech except
in cases of extraordinary need and with the exercise of a degree of care
that we have not elsewhere required." 2
71. Id.
72. Id. at 2385.
73. Id. at 2388.
74. Id. at 2385. This presented an unusual understanding of what it means to decide
a case "narrowly." Conventionally, we describe an opinion as deciding a case more narrowly
than another when it reaches the same result as the other, but on more limited grounds.
Here, though, Justice Breyer's distillation of the cases led him to apply a different standard
than Justice Kennedy's strict scrutiny, and to reach a different result. See id. at 2387-88.
75. Id. at 2388.
76. Id. at 2384.
77. Id.
78. 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
79. 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
80. 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
81. 116 S.Ct. at 2385.
82. Id. at 2384.
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Justice Breyer's contextual assessment led him to divergent results in
evaluating the public-access and leased-access provisions. After
evaluating a "complex balance of interests," he concluded that the leased-
access provision was constitutional.' "[T]he need to protect children
from exposure to patently offensive sex-related material" was extremely
important, and had often been found compelling."' The provision was
merely permissive, and served to empower cable operators even as it
disadvantaged access programmers. The case raised the same concerns
about accessibility of indecent speech to children, and invasion of the
"privacy of the home," as did the Court's 1978 decision in FCC v. Pacifica
Foundation"s (in which a plurality upheld FCC action disciplining a
radio station for broadcasting an "indecent" monologue on a weekday
afternoon 6 ). Indeed, the two cases presented "remarkably similar"
problems, and the 1992 amendments embodied a balance commensurate
with the one Pacifica approved.87 As in Pacifica, adults desiring to view
such speech could find it elsewhere. The provision was likely less
restrictive than that upheld in Pacifica, because individual cable
operators might choose not to exercise their veto, or might choose to do
so only during daytime hours.88
Public-forum analysis, Breyer continued, could not legitimately lead
to a different result.
[T]he effects of Congress' decision on the interests of programmers, viewers,
cable operators, and children are the same, whether we characterize
Congress' decision as one that limits access to a public forum, discriminates
in common carriage, or constrains speech because of its content. If we
consider this particular limitation of indecent television programming
acceptable as a constraint on speech, we must no less accept the limitation
it places on access to the claimed public forum .... 89
Even if the Court engaged in public-forum analysis, he continued, unless
"a label alone were to make a critical First Amendment difference ...
the features of this case that we have already discussed - the govern-
ment's interest in protecting children, the 'permissive' aspect of the
statute, and the nature of the medium - sufficiently justify the 'limita-
tion' on the availability of this forum."90
83. Id. at 2387.
84. Id. at 2386.
85. 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
86. See Jonathan Weinberg, Vagueness and Indecency, 3 VILL. SPoRTs & ENT. L.J.
221, 235-45 (1996).
87. 116 S. Ct. at 2386.
88. Id. at 2387.
89. Id. at 2389.
90. Id.
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The plurality's balancing yielded the opposite result when it comes to
public-access channels. 9' Those were channels, Justice Breyer reasoned,
that the cable operator had not historically controlled; cable operators
had agreed to reserve them for public use as part of the franchise
conditions. Their use was normally supervised by access channel
managers, often nonprofit organizations, and those channel managers
were capable of addressing the issue of indecent programming should it
arise. In that context, granting the cable operator a veto over indecent
programming was less crucial, and the risk bulked larger that cable
operators would erroneously bar programming that was not in fact
offensive. Indeed, the record showed no "significant nationwide pattern"
of indecent speech on public-access channels.2 The provision allowing
cable operators to reject indecent speech on public-access channels, thus,
was unconstitutional because insufficiently tailored to the government's
legitimate ends.93
2. Justice Kennedy
Justice Kennedy,"' like Justice Breyer, began his opinion by discuss-
ing state action. Like Justice Breyer, he saw no need to waste words on
the issue.
In [the 1992 amendments], Congress singles out one sort of speech for
vulnerability to private censorship in a context where content-based
discrimination is not otherwise permitted. The plurality at least recognizes
this as state action, avoiding the mistake made by the Court of Appeals.
State action lies in the enactment of a statute altering legal relations
between persons, including the selective withdrawal from one group of
protections from private acts, regardless of whether the private acts are
attributable to the State.95
The 1992 amendments obviously met that standard.
91. The plurality for this part of Justice Breyer's opinion consisted only of himself and
Justices Stevens and Souter. Justice O'Connor disagreed, finding no "constitutionally
significant" difference between the, two permissive provisions. Id. at 2403 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justices Kennedy and Ginsburg provided the
remaining two votes to strike down the public-access provision.
92. Id. at 2396.
93. In the only part of his opinion joined by a majority of the Court, Justice Breyer
found that § 10(b) of the 1992 amendments - the "segregate-and-block" provision - was
unconstitutional because not "a narrowly, or reasonably, tailored effort to protect children."
Id. at 2394.
94. Joined by Justice Ginsburg.
95. Id. at 2404-05 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in
part, and dissenting in part) (citations to the plurality opinion, the court of appeals opinion,
and Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969), omitted). The quoted sentences, plus the
citations listed above, constitute the entirety of Justice Kennedy's state action analysis.
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Kennedy's approach to the First Amendment issues in the case was
strikingly different from Breyer's. He argued energetically, and with
some force, that both the leased-access and the public-access provisions
before the Court were unconstitutional. Rather than engaging in a
balancing analysis, he started from the premise that the First Amend-
ment renders suspect any statute drawing distinctions on content-based
grounds. The 1992 amendments were problematic because they regulated
speech non-neutrally, giving crucial weight to content-based distinctions.
Public access channels, Kennedy argued, are government-created
public forums. Local governments initially conditioned the franchise on
promises from cable operators that they would dedicate channels for
expressive activity; "when a local government contracts to use private
property for public expressive activity, it creates a public forum."96
Because the 1992 amendments deny programmers of "indecent" speech
access to a public forum, he continued, they are subject to strict scrutiny.
The analysis for leased-access channels, minus the "public forum" label,
was the same: there was no public forum "in the sense of taking property
from private control and dedicating it to public use," but government had
created a functionally equivalent common-carrier obligation.97 Once
government had imposed a mandate "ensur[ing] open, nondiscriminatory
access to the means of communication," it subjected itself to strict
scrutiny when it removed its "protection from a single form of speech
based on its content."8 Both of the permissive provisions, Justice
Kennedy continued, failed strict scrutiny because they were not narrowly
tailored to achieve their stated goals. 99
3. Justice Thomas
Justice Thomas's analysis 1°° contains no explicit discussion of state
action. His starting point, as emphatic as that of Justice Kennedy, leads
him to the opposite result: First Amendment rights subsist, first and
foremost, in the owners of the communications resources used to
disseminate the speech. In the cable television context, that means "[uit
is the [cable system] operator's right that is preeminent .... [W]hen
there is a conflict, a programmer's asserted right to transmit over an
96. 116 S.Ct. at 2410.
97. Id. at 2412.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 2416-17. Justice Kennedy joined the portion of Justice Breyer's opinion
holding that § 10(b), the "segregate-and-block" provision, was unconstitutional. Id. at 2419;
see supra note 92.
100. Joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia.
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operator's cable system must give way to the operator's editorial
discretion." 1
Thomas questioned whether petitioners - programmers and viewers
- could assert First Amendment rights at all in Denver Area. After all,
the access right was statutory, not constitutionally based; few would
argue that the Constitution routinely grants programmers a right to use
somebody else's privately-owned equipment to disseminate their
speech.' 2 While programmers have a First Amendment right "to
compete for space on an operator's system," 3 so that the Constitution
would demand strict scrutiny of a law forbidding the carriage of indecent
programming on access channels, the direction of the constitutional pull
is always in favor of the operator's editorial autonomy. An editorial
decision by the private-sector cable operator cannot give rise to a
violation of programmers' First Amendment rights.
Thomas emphasized that public-access and leased-access requirements
displace cable operators from selecting programming on certain channels,
notwithstanding that the cable operator owns the programming
hardware. Public-access and leased-access requirements thus impinge on
the cable operators' own First Amendment interests, imposing on cable
operators "a type of forced speech."'0 ' Cable operators, in short, were
the injured parties; it could not violate programmers' First Amendment
rights that the government had chosen to burden cable operators'
101. 116 S.Ct. at 2421 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting
in part).
102. Id. at 2421-22.
103. Id. at 2424.
-104. Id. at 2423. Justice Thomas suggested, indeed, that such requirements are
unconstitutional. Id. at 2423 n.6. In Time Warner Entertainment Co. v. FCC, 93 F.3d 957
(D.C. Cir. 1996), the D.C. Circuit rejected constitutional attacks on the 1992 Act's
requirement that cable operators carry leased-access channels, and on its endorsement of
local franchising authorities' authority to require public-access channels. In discussing
leased-access channels, the court reasoned that the requirement is content-neutral, and
serves important government interests in "promoting the widespread dissemination of
information from a multiplicity of sources" and "promoting fair competition in the market
for television programming." Id. at 969 (quoting Turner Broadcasting Sys. v. FCC, 114
S.Ct. 2445, 2469-70 (1994)). It is narrowly tailored to serve those interests because it
requires cable operators to allocate channels for leased access only to the extent that
leased-access programmers in fact use them (and only up to the 10-15% maximum set out
in the statute). As for public-access channels, the court noted that different franchising
authorities could impose widely varying public-access requirements; it ruled that plaintiffs
facial challenge could succeed only if no public-access requirement could be constitutional.
The court was confident, though, that a requirement that a cable operator provide a single
channel for public use, open to everyone on a nondiscriminatory basis, would not violate the
First Amendment. Such a requirement would be content neutral, would serve an important
purpose (promoting "public access to a multiplicity of information sources") unrelated to the
suppression of free expression, and would be narrowly tailored to serve that goal. Id. at
973 (quoting Turner, 114 S.Ct. at 2470).
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constitutional rights on programmers' behalf, but had not done so across
the board.0 5
B. THE DISAPPEARANCE OF STATE ACTION ANALYSIS?
It is striking that the three Justices expended so little ink on state
action analysis. That, after all, was the topic that had bedeviled the
lower-court judges, and has presented the Supreme Court with some of
its most knotty problems. Yet none of the Justices thought it worth more
than a paragraph's discussion. The issue, though, could not be disposed
of so easily. Each of the Justices incorporated the missing state action
concerns, on an implicit level, into his First Amendment analysis. To
show this, I will return to the opinions in reverse order - first Justice
Thomas's, then Justice Kennedy's, and finally Justice Breyer's.
1. Justice Thomas
Justice Thomas's dissenting opinion came closest to the analysis of the
D.C. Circuit en banc. The opinion never referred to "state action," but its
central themes touched directly on state action concerns. It relied at its
core on the bedrock understanding that a cable operator's refusal to carry
programming is not a governmentally-imposed burden on speech,
because cable operators are not government; rather, they are private,
autonomous speakers. Justice Thomas asked skeptically how "a
programmer's ordinarily unprotected interest in affirmative transmission
of its programming acquires constitutional significance in leased and
public access channels," but his own opinion answered the question: the
interest can "acquire constitutional significance" if it is burdened by the
government in a content-based manner.0 6 The programmer's interest
had no constitutional significance for Thomas because, he took for
granted, carriage decision by private cable operators did not implicate
government action.
Justice Thomas's discussion drew on basic concerns of individual
autonomy that underlie state action doctrine. Whenever a court applies
constitutional constraints to an action that on its face looks like private
action, it invades the autonomy of the actor in the name of the Constitu-
tion. This is at least somewhat anomalous, for standard doctrine teaches
105. Justice Thomas, finally, argued that § 10(b) of the 1992 amendments (the
segregate-and-block requirement) was constitutional, because narrowly tailored to achieve
the government's compelling interest in protecting minors from the influence of indecent
speech. 116 S.Ct. at 2428-32.
106. "If Congress had forbidden cable operators to carry indecent programming on
leased and public access channels, that law would have burdened the programmers' right
... to compete for space on an operator's system. The Court would undoubtedly strictly
scrutinize such a law." Id. at 2424.
19971
COLUMBIA-VLA JOURNAL OF LAW & THE ARTS
that the Constitution places no constraint on private action. We justify
it on the ground that the assertedly private action was not autonomous
at all, that it is in some meaningful sense "really" government ac-
tion.0' But if the action in question is not only assertedly private but
also constitutionally protected, then a finding of state action threatens
to render the constitutional doctrine incoherent. In Columbia Broadcast-
ing System v. Democratic National Committee, '0 for example, respon-
dents challenged broadcasters' refusal to accept certain political
advertisements, and the FCC's refusal to insist that broadcasters run the
advertisements. A divided Court rejected the claim. To view First
Amendment speakers as state actors violating the First Amendment,
Chief Justice Burger answered for a plurality, "would be a contradic-
tion."1o9
In Denver Area, so long as Justice Thomas maintained the focus on
cable operators as the asserted bad actors, he made it impossible for
programmers to articulate a coherent constitutional claim. Cable
operators are not the government, and it seems problematic that their
decisions regarding what programming to carry - decisions at least
presumptively protected by the First Amendment - in fact amount to
state action violating it. This approach to state action analysis, on the
other hand, has its limitations. The state action discussion in Columbia
Broadcasting System v. Democratic National Committee, focusing on the
question whether broadcasters were themselves "state actors," may have
obscured the more profound constitutional question in that case -
whether the First Amendment's zealous protection of the marketplace of
ideas required the FCC (itself surely a state actor) to ensure that
broadcasters carried political ads."0 Similarly here, Justice Thomas'
emphasis on cable operators, and their First Amendment rights, left in
the shadows the question whether Congress' allocation of authority
between programmer and cable operator was unconstitutional because
non-neutral as to content."'
107. "[Tlhe inquiry must be whether there is a sufficiently close nexus between the
State and the challenged action of the regulated entity so that the action of the latter may
fairly be treated as that of the State itself." Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S.
345, 351 (1974).
108. 412 U.S. 94 (1973).
109. Id. at 120-21 (opinion of Burger, C.J.).
110. See generally LAURENCE H. TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICES 253-57 (1985).
111. Justice Thomas made additional arguments: first, that the 1992 amendments
cannot violate the First Amendment because Congress designed them to empower cable
operators to use their own property to speak; second, that the indecency restrictions should
be viewed as part of the larger set of statutory provisions creating the access right. Since
that set of provisions, viewed as a whole, expanded programmers' ability to speak,
programmers again had no occasion for First Amendment challenge. 116 S. Ct. at 2424-25.
Both of these positions, though, flowed from his foundational stress on cable operators as
the central actors in the First Amendment drama; he viewed Congress' non-neutrality as
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2. Justice Kennedy
The interplay of state action considerations in Justice Kennedy's
opinion is a bit more elaborate. Justice Kennedy purported to dispose of
the state action question at the start; he pronounced that the 1992
amendments constitute state action because they "alter legal relations
between persons." That quick answer, though, seems less than entirely
satisfying. For one thing, it seems inconsistent with Flagg Brothers, Inc.
v. Brooks,12 in which the Court found no state action in an analogous
challenge to action taken pursuant to a statute that altered legal
relations between persons. More importantly, as Justice Breyer
recognized, while "state action" is obvious in the enactment of any
statute, one must still face the question in this case whether it is
Congress, rather than the cable system operators, who should be held
responsible for any diminution in access programmers' ability to
speak." 3 If responsibility lies with the cable operators, then it is hard
to escape the conclusion that there is no relevant state action.
To understand Justice Kennedy's response, it's useful to consider an
argument made in a Denver Area amicus brief. The Family Research
Council urged that the 1992 amendments were subject to no searching
government scrutiny because they merely allocated programmers a
government subsidy- a government-created right to use somebody else's
property for their speech." 4 It is well-settled that government is
subject to no more than minimal First Amendment scrutiny, as a general
matter, when it subsidizes speech along content-based lines. In Regan v.
Taxation with Representation,"5 for example, the Court held unani-
mously that Congress may distribute funds to subsidize speech as "a
matter of policy and discretion not open to judicial review," at least so
long it does not intend "the suppression of dangerous ideas.""6 In Rust
simply irrelevant.
112. 436 U.S. 149 (1978). In Flagg Brothers, the Court rejected a due process
challenge to actions taken pursuant to a UCC provision allowing warehouse owners to sell
bailed goods in order to recover unpaid storage charges. In that case as in Denver Area,
a statute altered legal relations between persons by authorizing private action that would
not otherwise have been legal.
113. See supra text accompanying note 66.
114. See Brief of Amici Curiae Family Research Council and National Law Center for
Children and Families at 5-15, Denver Area, 116 S.Ct. 2374.
115. 461 U.S. 540 (1983).
116. Id. at 548-49 (quoting Cincinnati Soap Co. v. United States, 310 U.S. 308, 317
(1937), and Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 513 (1959)). In Board of Education,
Island Trees School District v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982), while a divided Court concluded
that public school authorities may not remove books from school libraries on the basis of
viewpoint, the Justices did not begin to suggest that .any First Amendment limitations
governed the acquisition of books.
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v. Sullivan,'17 the Court explained that government's freedom to grant
differential subsidies for speech is so broad that the state may even
forbid the recipients of government largesse, in the context of a
government-funded project, to express disfavored ideas (in that case, that
abortion was an appropriate method of family planning).
This subsidy argument reformulated the D.C. Circuit's state action
concerns. The essence of the constitutional claim in a typical subsidy case
is that the government has merely declined to fund plaintiffs speech.
The Court ruled in Taxation with Representation that such a decision
generally does not trigger constitutional scrutiny, for "although
government may not place obstacles in the path of a person's exercise of
freedom of speech, it need not remove those not of its own creation."""
Put another way, the government has not "acted" at all vis-a-vis such a
plaintiff, and the Constitution gives him no basis to challenge state
inaction. The relevance of the argument to Denver Area is plain:
notwithstanding that government drew content-based lines in granting
some speakers, but not others, a right of access to cable channels,
plaintiffs must come up short if that right of access is a mere subsidy, in
the Taxation with Representation sense, that Congress has power to
grant or deny. As the D.C. Circuit put it, "[wihatever may be said in
support of indecent programming on access channels, Congress surely
does not have to promote it.""9 Justice Thomas drew on this point in
arguing that "government intervention that grants access programmers
an opportunity to speak that they would not otherwise enjoy... cannot
be an infringement of the same programmers' First Amendment rights,
even if the new speaking opportunity is content-based."'20
Justice Kennedy's answer lay in his contention that public-access and
leased-access channels are public forums, or their functional equivalents.
That categorical move necessarily trumped the subsidy argument: "[Tihe
existence of a Government 'subsidy,' in the form of Government-owned
property, does not justify the restriction of speech in areas that have
'been traditionally open to the public for expressive activity,' or have
been 'expressly dedicated to speech activity.'" 121 Rosenberger v. Rector
of University of Virginia12' illustrates that point. In Rosenberger,
plaintiffs had challenged a state university's refusal to provide student
activities funding, of the sort received by many student publications, to
117. 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
118. 461 U.S. at 549-50 (quoting Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 316 (1980) (Justice
Rehnquist's ellipsis and brackets omitted)).
119. Alliance for Community Media v. FCC, 56 F.3d 105, 118 (D.C.Cir. 1995), affd in
part & rev'd in part sub nom. Denver Area Educ. Telecommunications Consortium v. FCC,
116 S.Ct. 2374 (1996).
120. 116 S.Ct. at 2424.
121. Rust, 500 U.S. at 199-200.
122. 115 S.Ct. 2510 (1995) (opinion by Kennedy, J.).
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their Christian magazine. The university, citing Rust and Taxation with
Representation, answered that it could draw such distinctions in
determining which speech to subsidize. 23 The Court disagreed. To be
sure, "we have permitted the government to regulate the content of what
is or is not expressed when it is the speaker or when it enlists private
entities to convey its own message." 24 But the matter is different when
government has created a limited public forum25 - when the point of
the government subsidy is to "encourage a diversity of views from private
speakers."2 1 In that context, denial of a subsidy on speech-based
grounds is no more than censorship.
The finding of a public forum overcomes state action concerns because
it transforms our perception of the government action. In the absence of
a public forum or something functionally similar, government can
plausibly argue that it is not "acting" when it fails to give a would-be
speaker access to a public resource; it is merely declining to give him
affirmative assistance. Where government has established a public forum
or otherwise acted to ensure public access to a communications resource,
on the other hand, it is hard to view its singling out of particular would-
be speakers as anything other than a constitutionally cognizable
exclusion. 1
27
3. Justice Breyer
Justice Breyer, too, broached the state action issue at the start of his
opinion. The real issue, he said, was not whether an Act of Congress was
state action. The question, rather, was whether the 1992 amendments
"restrict[] speech." This language incorporates a worthwhile insight. In
many cases that raise "state action" concerns, it is unhelpful to center
one's analysis on the presence or absence of state action as such; one can
123. Defendant also argued that its grant of funding to the Christian magazine would
amount to an unconstitutional establishment of religion. See id. at 2521-25.
124. Id. at 2518.
125. Id. at 2516-17.
126. Id. at 2519.
127. This issue of characterization keeps popping up in the differences between
Justices Breyer and Kennedy in this case. Justice Breyer muses that government might
well be able "to dedicate a public forum to one type of content," without subjecting itself to
strict scrutiny. "Must a local government, for example, show a compelling state interest
if it builds a band shell in the park and dedicates it solely to classical music (but not to
jazz)? The answer is not obvious." 116 S.Ct. at 2389. Justice Kennedy answers that the
analogy is not apposite - "[olur case is more akin to the Government's creation of a band
shell in which all types of music might be performed except for rap music." Id. at 2414.
Cf Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975) (municipal board acted
unconstitutionally in denying application to present the musical "Hair" at city-leased
theatre); Louis Michael Seidman, The State Action Doctrine, 10 CONST. CoMM. 379, 384
(1993) (making a nice analogous point about the importance of characterization in the
"takings" context).
1997]
COLUMBIA-VLA JOURNAL OF LAW & THE ARTS
find some state action (if only the decision to tolerate private acts
threatening constitutional values) in just about any case. Often it is more
useful to ask whether the government choice is unconstitutional as a
matter of substantive constitutional law.' In Shelley v. Kraemer,1
2 9
the puzzle case of modern state action law, for example, the presence of
"state action" was hardly controversial: how else could one characterize
a judicial order backed by the coercive power of the state of Missouri?
The difficult question was whether the state court's policy of enforcing
restrictive covenants was unconstitutional."0
As Justice Breyer recognized, though, this insight does not make state
action issues disappear; it simply moves them into a (perhaps) more
manageable forum."' The plurality opinion now had the responsibility
of answering the question whether the 1992 amendments "restrict[]
speech." Respondents had taken the position that the statutes did not -
and could not - themselves restrict speech, because they were merely
permissive; any restriction of speech had to be laid at the feet of the
private, autonomous, cable system operators. The plurality, though, did
not speak to this question. Instead, it leapt right into the question
whether the statutory provisions "properly address[] an extremely
important problem, without imposing, in light of the relevant interests,
an unnecessarily great restriction on speech. " 1 2 It held the public-
access provision unconstitutional without ever returning to its state
action discussion.
Can this be? Did the plurality simply ignore the state action issue,
resolving it neither explicitly nor implicitly? Not, I think, exactly. State
action considerations did reappear in the plurality's analysis. In
calculating the "complex balance of interests" surrounding the leased-
128. See Robert J. Glennon, Jr. & John E. Nowak, A Functional Analysis of the
Fourteenth Amendment "State Action" Requirement, 1976 SuP. CT. REv. 221; William W.
Van Aistyne, Mr. Justice Black, Constitutional Review, and the Talisman of State Action,
1965 DUKE L.J. 219.
129. 334 U.S. 1 (1948). The Supreme Court in this case reversed, as inconsistent with
the Equal Protection Clause, a state court order enforcing a restrictive covenant that
forbade sale of the burdened land to African-Americans. The decision "is widely regarded
as one of the most controversial and problematic decisions in all of constitutional law."
GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL, CONsTrTUTONAL LAw 1617 (2d ed. 1991).
130. Chief Justice Vinson's opinion in Shelley is unsatisfying in part because it expends
a great many words proving that a state-court order is "state action," and very few on the
proposition that Missouri's undoubted action was unconstitutional. For efforts to supply
the latter, see, e.g., Louis Henkin, Shelley v. Kraemer: Notes for a Revised Opinion, 110 U.
PA. L. REv. 473 (1962); TRIBE, supra note 110, at 260.
131. Shelley illustrates the point. Asking whether the state court's willingness to
enforce the restrictive covenant amounted to an equal protection violation is the first step
in the constitutional analysis, but hardly the last; courts' ability uncontroversially to
enforce at least some background legal rules is what makes the public-private distinction
(and hence state action doctrine) possible. See Seidman, supra note 127, at 392-93.
132. See supra text accompanying note 72.
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access and public-access provisions, the plurality noted that the
provisions were permissive, and that the access requirements involved
a balance between the First Amendment interests of access programmers
and cable operators. Its bottom line on § 10(a): 133
The existence of this complex balance of interests persuades us that the
permissive nature of the provision, coupled with its viewpoint-neutral
application, is a constitutionally permissible way to protect children from
the type of sexual material that concerned Congress, while accommodating
both the First Amendment interests served by the access requirements and
those served in restoring to cable operators a degree of the editorial control
that Congress removed in 1984."
The plurality, I think, considered both state action issues and the First
Amendment considerations in a single overarching balancing process.
That was how the plurality determined whether the provisions "re-
strict[ed] speech."
Good or bad, this is unprecedented. Such an approach was urged by
academics in the 1960s and 70s, 5 but I am aware of no other Supreme
Court decision adopting it. What explains this sudden shift in methodol-
ogy? I will attempt to answer that question in Part III. First, though, I
will identify a second, related mystery in Justice Breyer's opinion.
C. CATEGORIZATION AND BALANCING
Both Justice Kennedy's and Justice Thomas's opinions relied heavily
on categorization and rules. That seems appropriate; as Kennedy put it,
"the central achievement of our First Amendment jurisprudence" is
judicial adherence to stringent, abstract First Amendment rules. Those
rules "state in advance how to test a law's validity, rather than letting
the height of the bar be determined by the apparent exigencies of the
day." 36 The plurality opinion, on the other hand, explicitly rejected any
reliance on "categorical" doctrine such as public forum law; instead, it
stressed "contextual" assessment.
The public forum rules, according to Justice Breyer, were inapposite
because they were "developed in very different contexts," and lack
"flexibility." 137 This is not a satisfying explanation. It is true that
public-forum doctrine, like First Amendment doctrine in general, is
abstract rather than particularistic, applying across a wide range of fact-
133. The 1992 Act § 10(a) at 1486 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 532(h)).
134. Denver Area Educ. Telecom. Consortium v. FCC, 116 S.Ct. 2374, 2387 (1996).
135. See Glennon & Nowak, supra note 128; Henkin, supra note 130; see also Van
Alstyne, supra note 128.
136. 116 S.Ct. at 2406; see also Schauer, supra note 65.
137. 116 S.Ct. at 2384.
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situations. It is true, moreover, that it relies on categorization rather
than balancing. Rather than sensitively weighing the competing
considerations arising out of the particular facts of a speaker's wishing
access to government resources, a court applying the doctrine must
crudely pigeonhole the case before it into the obtuse categories of public
forum, limited public forum, and nonpublic forum; the result follows
automatically from there. 3 ' But that problem, if problem it be, arises
every time a court applies public forum doctrine; it supplies no excuse for
relying on the doctrine most of the time but departing from it in this
particular instance. Indeed, the abstraction of public-forum law has been
hailed as one of its strengths, "prevent[ing] the free speech decision
maker from 'thinking small.'""39
More strikingly, the tone of the plurality opinion seems to bespeak a
rejection of legal doctrine in general. The theme of the opinion seems to
be something like this: "Justices Kennedy and Thomas present doctrinal
arguments; we, on the other hand, think that following doctrine might
lead us astray. As a result, we're going to rely on contextual, situation-
ally sensitive decision making - that is, following our guts." Late in its
discussion of the leased-access provision, the plurality explained how the
precedential force of Pacifica, together with the plurality's other
reasoning, overcame Justice Kennedy's public-forum argument. The
plurality, though, does not really seem to have been following the
standard maneuver of declining to decide a doctrinal issue because some
other doctrinal issue takes the first one out of the case (as where the
Court declines to decide whether rational-basis analysis or strict scrutiny
applies, because the statute at issue fails either test).' 4° Rather, in
important respects, the plurality seems to have been saying that it would
be unwise to decide the case on the basis of categorical, inflexible,
abstract legal doctrine at all. It is not often one sees a Supreme Court
plurality apparently disowning the idea - commonly referred to as the
Rule of Law - that courts decide cases according to doctrinal com-
mands.' 4 '
One might respond here that the plurality did not reject the Rule of
Law at all; rather, it rejected only the law of rules. 142 Balancing, after
all, is a legitimate mode of constitutional analysis. For example, in
138. See Sullivan, Post-Liberal Judging, supra note 62, at 310-11.
139. Schauer, supra note 65, at 408.
140. See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 116 S.Ct. 1620 (1996).
141. "[O]urs is a government of laws, not of men, and.., we submit ourselves to rulers
only if under rules." Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 646 (1952)
(Jackson, J., concurring); see Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional
Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1959); Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U.
CHi. L. REv. 1175 (1989).
142. See supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text. I owe the wordplay to Scalia,
supra note 141.
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interpreting the due process clause, though Justice Scalia advocates the
rule-like answer that that due process protects only those practices,
defined at the most specific level, that were protected against govern-
ment interference when the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified,'" a
majority of today's Court adheres to the balancing approach of Justice
Harlan:
Due process has not been reduced to any formula; its content cannot be
determined by reference to any code. The best that can be said is that
through the course of this Court's decisions it has represented the balance
which our Nation, built upon postulates of respect for the liberty of the
individual, has struck between that liberty and the demands of organized
society. 1'4
In both the state action and First Amendment contexts, one might argue,
the plurality simply adopted a contextual, balancing approach rather
than a categorical one.
There surely were arguments favoring balancing in Denver Area.
Because balancing focuses on the facts of each particular case, the
outcome of a balancing analysis will not have sweeping, unexamined,
precedential value; balancing is thus consistent with incrementalism and
humility, which surely have their place in constitutional law.'" Some
have argued that balancing is most appropriate, and rules least, where
our learning and confidence are most lacking;'" this finds a reflection
in Justice Breyer's concern that it would be "premature" to freeze
constitutional analysis of cable TV given "the changes taking place in the
law, the technology, and the industrial structure, related to telecommuni-
cations."'47
In the state action area, some scholars in the 1960s and 70s urged
that courts resolve state action questions through explicit balancing;
1960s Supreme Court cases contain language to the same effect. 14
9
143. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 127 n. 6 (1989) (opinion of Scalia, J.).
144. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting); see Sullivan,
Post-Liberal Judging, supra note 62, at 77-81.
145. See Paul Gewirtz, On "I Know It When I See It," 105 YALE L.J. 1023, 1026-27
(1996).
146. See Charles P. Curtis, A Better Theory of Legal Interpretation, 3 VAND. L. REV.
407, 424 (1950) (a legal directive "should be as flexible, as elastic, indeed as vague, as the
future is uncertain and unpredictable"); see also Schlag, supra note 62, at 424-26 (finding
the formulation unsatisfactory).
147. 116 S.Ct. at 2385; see also id. at 2401-03 (Souter, J., concurring).
148. See sources cited supra note 133.
149. See Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 378 (1967); Burton v. Wilmington Parking
Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961). Burton explains that one cannot devise an abstract
"formula" for the presence of state action; courts can reach conclusions only contextually,
"by sifting facts and weighing circumstances." 365 U.S. at 722. "This differs from Justice
Stewart's famous 'I know it when I see it' standard for judging obscenity mainly in the
1997]
COLUMBIA-VLA JOURNAL OF LAW & THE ARTS
While core First Amendment philosophy requires that the law actually
regulating citizens' speech be cast in the form of rules (for example, a
statute providing that "citizens will be liable in damages for defamatory
statements if and only if the damage they do to the social fabric
outweighs the value of their speech in promoting public discourse" would
be unconstitutionally vague), courts have often engaged in balancing to
accomplish First Amendment analysis: to determine whether a regula-
tion goes too far in suppressing speech, or what sort of speech is worthy
of what level of protection.5 ° Indeed, the courts have found strict
categorization simply unworkable in certain First Amendment areas;
witness Judge Leventhal's intrepid but doomed attempt to systematize
obscenity law, in 1972, by categorizing the Supreme Court's case law on
the basis of body parts revealed, sexual positions, numbers of partici-
pants, and so on.15" '
This answer, though, seems completely insufficient in this case. For
starters, the Court in recent decades has moved ever farther from
balancing, and towards rules, in both state action5 2 and First Amend-
ment"5' analysis. More fundamentally, an affection for balancing is
simply insufficient to explain the Denver Area plurality opinion. The
plurality wasn't embracing balancing on a blank slate; First Amendment
law is already out there, and incorporates a lot of rules. The plurality
opinion, declining to pay attention to those rules, challenges the
comparative precision of the latter." Paul Brest, State Action and Liberal Theory: A
Casenote on Flagg Brothers v. Brooks, 130 U. PA_ L. REV. 1296, 1325 (1982).
150. See Weinberg, supra note 62, at 1169 n.318.
151. Huffman v. United States, 470 F.2d 386, 396-402 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
152. Compare, e.g., San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic
Committee, 483 U.S. 522 (1987) and Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1982) with
Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
153. I should explain myself here, since others more august than I have suggested just
the opposite. See, e.g., T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing,
96 YALE L.J. 943, 967-68 (1987). Kathleen Sullivan notes that First Amendment analysis
importantly relies on balancing in its mid-level, mixed-outcome treatment of content-
neutral regulation. See Sullivan, Post-Liberal Judging, supra note 62, at 297. The Court,
though, has moved far from the ad hoc balancing apparent in cases such as Schneider v.
State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939). In that case, the Court really did seem to weigh the state
interests served by a leafletting ban against the damage that ban did to free speech. In
most modern cases (such as Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989)), by
contrast, there is no room for a judgment that a regulation should be upheld because the
burdened speech is of slight importance, or struck down because the burdened speech is
central to public discourse. Courts are directed to inquire whether the regulation advances
a "substantial" state interest; whether it burdens "substantially more speech than is
necessary" to further that interest; and whether it forecloses alternative channels of
communication. Id. at 791, 798-800. Granted, this is mid-level inquiry, and the test may
allow for some covert consideration of the value of the speech. See, e.g., City of Ladue v.
Gilleo, 114 S.Ct. 2038 (1994). But there is no weighing of "competing rights and interests
on a scale," Sullivan, supra, at 293-94; the court's reasoning process is better described as
last-minute categorization.
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conventional understanding that judges decide cases by applying doctrine
enunciated in prior cases, not by balancing any factor that comes to
hand. As Justice Kennedy put it, "formulations like strict scrutiny, used
... to ensure that the inequities of the moment are subordinated to
commitments made for the long run, mean little if they can be watered
down whenever they seem too strong. They mean still less if they can be
ignored altogether ... "'
IH. THE PUZZLING PERSISTENCE OF PACIFICA
An answer - or at least an antecedent - for both these mysteries can
be found in Justice Breyer's heavy reliance on Pacifica. It is Pacifica, in
the end, that dominates the Denver Area plurality's doctrinal reasoning,
and it offers the key to that opinion.
In Pacifica too, the Justices followed a situationally sensitive approach
to First Amendment analysis. Both of the opinions supporting the
judgment - Justice Stevens's plurality and Justice Powell's concurrence
- rely strikingly on contextualization, balancing and a rejection of
abstract doctrine. Recall the facts of the case: WBAI-FM in New York, on
a Tuesday afternoon, broadcast a twelve-minute monologue in which the
comic and social critic George Carlin repeatedly used certain four-letter
words (including the word "shit" or variants more than seventy times,
and the word "fuck" or variants more than thirty times).1 5 5 The FCC
concluded that the station had violated 18 U.S.C. § 1464's prohibition on
the broadcast of "obscene, indecent and profane language." It reasoned
that the concept of "indecency," in this context, was intimately connected
with the broadcast of "language that describes, in terms patently
offensive as measured by contemporary community standards for the
broadcast medium, sexual or excretory activities or organs, at times of
day when there is a reasonable risk that children may be in the
audience," and ruled that the WBAI broadcast violated that stan-
dard.156
Pacifica (WBAI's owner) conceded that the broadcast was "offensive"
and "shocking."1 5 7 It argued, however, that the FCC's standard would
burden large amounts of protected speech and was thus overbroad;
moreover, it claimed, the Carlin monologue was itself constitutionally
protected. The Supreme Court refused to address the overbreadth claim.
Justice Stevens, speaking for the Court, reasoned that the FCC's action
was an adjudication limited to a "specific factual context."5 8 The Court,
154. 116 S.Ct. at 2406 (citations omitted).
155. See Weinberg, supra note 86, at 235.
156. Pacifica Found. (WBAI-FM), 56 F.C.C.2d 94, 96-98 (1975), on reconsid., 59
F.C.C.2d 892 (1976), revd, 566 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir. 1977), reu'd, 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
157. 438 U.S. at 747.
158. Id. at 734.
1997]
COLUMBIA-VLA JOURNAL OF LAW & THE ARTS
he argued, should similarly limit its focus; after all, it reviewed
"judgments, not... opinions."" 9
This analysis is problematic. It mischaracterized the FCC's action, and
moreover seems logically unsound as a device for avoiding conventional
overbreadth doctrine. In adjudication as well as in rulemaking, broad
statements by the regulator can have a chilling effect on speakers not
before the court; it is that chilling effect that justifies overbreadth
analysis."6 Perhaps recognizing these difficulties, Justice Stevens
offered other justifications, in the portion of his opinion signed only by
himself, Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist, for limiting review
to "the question whether the Commission has authority to proscribe this
particular broadcast." Such narrowly tailored review, he said, was
appropriate because "indecency is largely a function of context - it
cannot be adequately judged in the abstract."'"' In any event, he
continued, even if the FCC's standard were overbroad, it could chill only
low-value speech "at the periphery of First Amendment concern.""2
Justice Powell, for his part, suggested that it was appropriate for the
Court to limit its review to the particular facts before it because "the
Commission may be expected to proceed cautiously, as it has in the
past.""
Having confined their focus to the contextual, fact-specific examination
of the Commission's "authority to proscribe this particular broadcast,"
Justices Stevens and Powell turned to the merits of the constitutional
claim. It was not obvious that the Government should prevail. The
Solicitor General asserted interests in protecting unwitting listeners and
children from offensive speech. Cohen v. California,'" though, had
denied government authority to cleanse public speech of four-letter
words, except when necessary to prevent "essentially intolerable"
invasions of the privacy of captive auditors,"6 and Erzoznick v. City of
Jacksonville" had cautioned that "[sipeech that is neither obscene as
to youths nor subject to some other legitimate proscription cannot be
159. Id. (quoting Black v. Cutter Lab., 351 U.S. 292, 297 (1956)).
160. See Weinberg, supra note 86, at 241-42.
161. 438 U.S. at 742 (plurality opinion).
162. Id. at 743. Four Justices explicitly rejected that position in Pacifwca. See id. at 761
& n.4 (Powell, J., joined by Blackmun, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment); id. at 672-63 (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall, J., dissenting). Justices Stewart
and White did not address the question; Justice Stewart, however, had rejected a similar
argument two years earlier. See Young v. American Mini-Theatres, 427 U.S. 50, 85-88
(1976) (Stewart, J., dissenting). A majority of the Court, thus, was on record as rejecting
this rationale.
163. 438 U.S. at 761 n.4 (Powell, J., joined by Blackmun, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment).
164. 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
165. Id. at 21.
166. 422 U.S. 205 (1975).
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suppressed solely to protect the young from ideas or images that a
legislative body thinks unsuitable for them."16
Justice Stevens answered these objections by contextualizing and
balancing: by emphasizing that proper resolution of an indecency case
must look to its particular facts, for "[i]t is a characteristic of speech such
as this that both its capacity to offend and its 'social value'. . vary with
the circumstances."'6 Given the slight social value of Carlin's speech,
the limited First Amendment protection given to broadcasting, broadcast-
ing's "uniquely pervasive presence," its accessibility to children, and the
time of day, the Commission's action was permissible.'6 9 The opinion
enunciated no overarching rule of law, and relied little on abstract rules
found in earlier cases; on the contrary, Stevens proceeded contextually
and incrementally, in a situation in which he found no abstract rule
appropriate. Justice Powell's opinion took essentially the same ap-
proach. 7 '
With this understanding of Pacifica, the Denver Area case makes more
sense. It's apparent on the face of the opinion that the plurality followed
Pacifica doctrinally. It should be clear by now that the plurality followed
Pacifica jurisprudentially as well. Rejecting abstract doctrine and hard-
edged rules in favor of an ad hoc, contextual weighing of the policy
considerations presented by the case's particular facts, Justice Breyer
reproduced the balancing approach of Pacifica, eighteen years earlier.
Pacifica provides a model for the plurality's First Amendment analysis,
in which Breyer evaluated the "complex balance of interests" the case
presents, seeking to vindicate the "essence" of First Amendment
jurisprudence rather than actual First Amendment rules.'17
Indeed, Pacifica helps explain the plurality's state action analysis as
well. That analysis makes sense only if we see the plurality as simply
dumping the considerations underlying the state action dilemma into its
overall First Amendment balancing. Such an approach is inconsistent
with modern state action doctrine because that doctrine is essentially
rule-bound, and spurns ad hoc balancing.172 But it is wholly consistent
with the devotion to balancing that the plurality inherited from Pacifica.
This answer, though, generates another question. Justice Breyer's
adoption of Pacifica's approach to constitutional analysis is in many
ways the most curious thing about the Denver Area decision. Pacifica,
after all, "has been described as possibly the worst of all of the Supreme
167. Id. at 213-14.
168. 438 U.S. at 747 (quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572
(1942)).
169. 438 U.S. at 748-50.
170. See id. at 755-62.
171. See supra text accompanying notes 76-88.
172. See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
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Court First Amendment decisions. " 17 3 After Pacifica was decided,
courts and FCC quickly reinterpreted it in a more conventional,
doctrinally grounded manner. The D.C. Circuit ruled that an FCC
restriction on broadcast indecency could be sustained only if it were
precisely drawn to serve the government's compelling interests in
protecting unsupervised children. 74 The Supreme Court appeared to
endorse this approach in Sable Communications, Inc. v. FCC,175 in
which it applied strict scrutiny to a prohibition on "indecent" telephone
sex recordings, and found the statute wanting because insufficiently
narrowly drawn.'76 Both FCC and D.C. Circuit, after Sable, repeatedly
treated Pacifica as if it had been decided quite differently, so that the
government's content-based restriction on broadcast indecency could
stand only if it were necessary to achieving a compelling government
interest. 7 7 The D.C. Circuit repeatedly struck down, as inconsistent
with the First Amendment, attempts to codify Pacifica for general
application.'78 The Supreme Court, for its part, rejected attempts to
extend Pacifica's reasoning from the special case of over-the-air
broadcast into other areas.'
In short, although Pacifica's holding remained good law, there seemed
to be nothing left of its foundational assumption that courts could
address restrictions on indecency through ad hoc, situationally sensitive
173. C. Edwin Baker, The Evening Hours During Pacifica Standard Time, 3 VILL.
SPORTS & ENT. L. REV. 45, 45 (1996) (characterizing Thomas Krattenmaker & L.A. Powe,
Jr., Televised Violence: First Amendment Principles and Social Science Theory, 64 VA. L.
REv. 1123 (1978)). Other commentators have been similarly uncharitable. See, e.g., Daniel
Brenner, Censoring the Airwaves: The Supreme Court's Pacifica Decision, in FREE BUT
REGULATED: CONFLICTING TRADITIONS IN MEDIA LAw 175 (Daniel L. Brenner & William L.
Rivers eds. 1982).
174. Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 852 F.2d 1332, 1343 n.18 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
This opinion was written by then-Judge (now Justice) Ginsburg. Justice Ginsburg did not
join the plurality opinion in Denver Area, instead joining Justice Kennedy's sharp dissent.
175. 492 U.S. 115 (1989).
176. Id. at 126-31.
177. See Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 58 F.3d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (en
banc), cert. denied, 116 S.Ct. 701 (1996); Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 932 F.2d
1504, 1509 (D.C. Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 913 (1992); Enforcement of Prohibitions
Against Broadcast Indecency, 8 F.C.C.Rcd. 704, 707 (1993) (asserting that a plan for
channeling broadcast indecency was constitutional because it was "a narrowly tailored
means of achieving the government's compelling objective"), remanded, Action for Children's
Television v. FCC, 58 F.3d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (en banc), cert. denied, 116 S.Ct. 701 (1996).
178. See Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 852 F.2d 1332 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Action
for Children's Television v. FCC, 932 F.2d 1504, 1509 (D.C. Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S.
913 (1992); Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 11 F.3d 170 (D.C. Cir. 1994), vacated,
15 F.3d 186 (D.C. Cir. 1984), en banc, 58 F.3d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S.Ct.
701 (1996).
179. See Sable, supra, notes 175-76; Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods Corp., 463 U.S. 60
(1983); see also Turner Broadcasting Sys. v. FCC, 114 S. Ct. 2445, 2456-57 (1994) (declaring
broadcast regulation precedents inapplicable to cable).
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analysis, without being troubled too much by abstract doctrine (such as
the requirement of strict scrutiny of content-based regulation). Yet that
is precisely the aspect of Pacifica that the Denver Area plurality revived,
and transformed into a model for the regulation of cable television. It's
hardly obvious that the Denver Area plurality should have returned to
Pacifica's contextual style. The move is especially questionable given the
Court's statement two years earlier that "the rationale for applying a less
rigorous standard of First Amendment scrutiny to broadcast regulation
... does not apply in the context of cable regulation."
1 8 0
What are the factors that made Denver Area like (or motivated the
Justices to treat it like) Pacifica? In attempting to answer that question,
it's worth noting the inherent intractability of government regulation of
indecent speech.11 Back in 1975, when the Pacifica case first came
before the FCC, Commissioner Robinson confessed his difficulties.
On reading George Carlin's monologue, my first instinct was to affirm his
opinion that these were indeed words "you couldn't say on the public...
airwaves." Reflection pushed me to the opposite extreme: proper respect for
the principles of free speech and of non-interference by government in
matters of public decency and decorum commands us to [rule for] Pacifica.
On still further reflection, I am led to conclude . . . that even a rigorous
respect for the principles of free speech and government non-intervention
permits some accommodation for the demands of decency.' 2
While adopting the Commission's "nuisance" rationale for regulation of
indecency, Robinson recognized that "the logic of this 'nuisance' test"..
. would support a wholly unacceptable censorship role for the FCC as
guardian of the public morals."s The arguments for free speech and for
regulation, he found, each carried with them internal logic denying any
role for the other: "[Tihere is no logical ground for compromise between
the right of free speech and the right to have public utterance limited"
in the interest of decorum. The conflicting claims cannot logically be
compromised or reconciled; they can only "be made to coexist by tour de
force."18
4
Robert Post has provided theoretical foundation for this point.'1 5 In
order to protect public discourse, he explains, the Court prohibits legal
180. Turner Broadcasting Sys. v. FCC, 114 S.Ct. 2445, 2456 (1994).
181. See, Lili Levi, The Hard Case of Broadcast Indecency, 20 N.Y.U. REv. L. & SOC.
CHANGE 49 (1992/93).
182. Pacifica Foundation, 56 F.C.C.2d 94, 103 (1975) (concurring statement of
Robinson, Comm'r, joined by Hooks, Comm'r).
183. Id. at 108.
184. Id. at 110.
185. See Robert C. Post, The Constitutional Concept of Public Discourse: Outrageous
Opinion, Democratic Deliberation, and Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 103 HARv. L. REv. 601,
680-84 (1990).
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institutions from penalizing speech that violates community norms of
propriety and decency. America, after all, contains many diverse
communities; the alternative would privilege cetain communities
through the legal system, and repress others." Suspending community
norms in that manner, though, is deeply problematic, since it is those
norms of civility and decency that make reasoned, noncoercive discourse
possible.'87 There can be no coherent accommodation of these compet-
ing claims when it comes to regulation of indecency; there can only be
ideologically-based line-drawing. l s
I have suggested elsewhere that it was natural for Pacifica to adopt
a balancing approach to broadcast indecency, and to announce a
boundary that allowed the government law-enforcer to make ad hoc,
contextualized enforcement decisions, because such an approach is
characteristic of our broadcast regulatory system on a fairly deep
level. 8 9 I won't reprise those arguments here. Rather, given that
Pacifica did adopt such an approach, I'll just try to address the question
why that reasoning bled over into Denver Area.
Denver Area was not a broadcasting case, but it had much in common
with Pacifica nonetheless. Here as in Pacifica, the plurality Justices saw
the FCC as attempting to enforce a commonsense, compromise solution
to a vexing problem. Here as in Pacifica, the Justices confronted a gut
feeling that abstract doctrine pointed away from the commonsense result.
And while cable television does not share the technological characteris-
tics of over-the-air broadcast, and is not governed by the same set of
legal rules, it felt like broadcasting to the Justices. Its cultural character-
istics were the same.
Justice Breyer, in Denver Area, characterized Pacifica as basing its
holding on broadcasting's "uniquely pervasive" nature, its confrontation
of the citizen in the home without warning, and its unique accessibility
to children.' The first two of these concerns, while highlighted in
Pacifica, had played virtually no role in post-Pacifica indecency law until
revived in the Denver Area opinion. 9 ' Justice Breyer reinvigorated
186. See id. at 627-33.
187. See id. at 633-44.
188. See id. at 683.
189. See Weinberg, supra note 86, at 245-57.
190. 116 S.Ct. at 2386.
191. See, e.g., Infinity Broadcasting Corp., 3 F.C.C.Rcd. 930, 931 (1987) ("our authority
is limited to the imposition of reasonable time, place and manner restrictions on the
broadcast of indecent material in order to advance the government's interest in protecting
children and in enabling parents to determine when and how their children are to be
exposed to this material"), affd in relevant part, Action for Children's Television v. FCC,
852 F.2d 1332 (D.C. Cir. 1988); see also Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 11 F.3d
170, 174-76 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (Commission cannot constitutionally rely on "protection of
adults" rationale to support indecency regulation), en banc, 58 F.3d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1995),
cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 701 (1996). The pervasiveness and intrusion rationales were the
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them, though, noting that "[a]ll these factors are present here." 92
Cable television programming is accessible to children, and, like over-
the-air TV, has established "a uniquely pervasive presence in the lives
of all Americans."193 Breyer noted that 63% of American homes sub-
scribe to cable (not "all Americans," surely, but a lot of them) and
proffers the dubiously useful statistic that households with cable watch
more television than households without."9 Cable viewers, he found,
are more "susceptible to random exposure to unwanted materials,"
because they are more likely to channel-surf before settling on a
program. 95 In sum, he concluded, Pacifica is "remarkably" apposite to
cable TV regulation.
In a part of his Pacifica opinion joined by a majority of the Court,
Justice Stevens had urged that "each medium of expression presents
special First Amendment problems," and that "of all forms of communica-
tion, it is broadcasting that has received the most limited First
Amendment protection." 196 This was a dramatic extension of prior law.
Previously, broadcasting's "special" status had been thought to flow from
spectrum scarcity; but no member of the Court in Pacifica thought that
scarcity issues supported the result in that case. As Justice Brennan
noted in dissent, "although scarcity has justified increasing the diversity
of speakers and speech, it has never been held to justify censorship.
After Pacifica, the Court once again described the special status of
broadcasting as flowing entirely from spectrum scarcity issues. Because
those issues had no direct parallel in the regulation of cable TV, the
Court announced, "application of the more relaxed standard of scrutiny
adopted in Red Lion and the other broadcast cases is inapt when
determining the First Amendment validity of cable regulation."'
Justice Breyer in Denver Area, though, explained that broadcast -
and cable - are indeed special for reasons that have nothing to do with
spectrum scarcity. Scarcity "has little to do with a case that involves the
effects of television viewing on children. Those effects are the result of
how parents and children view television programming, and how
pervasive and intrusive that programming is. In that respect, cable and
broadcast television differ little, if at all."' Pacifica and its ad hoc
subject of extensive academic criticism. See. e.g., LuCAS A. POWE, JR., AMERICAN
BROADCASTING AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 210-11 (1987).
192. 116 S.Ct. at 2386.
193. Id. (quoting Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 748).
194. Id.
195. Id. at 2386-87.
196. 438 U.S. at 748.
197. 438 U.S. at 770 n.4 (quoting Pacifica Foundation v. FCC, 556 F.2d 9, 29 (D.C. Cir.
1977) (Bazelon, J., concurring)) (emphasis in original).
198. Turner Broadcasting Sys. v. FCC, 114 S.Ct. 2445, 2457 (1994).
199. 116 S.Ct. at 2388.
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approach to First Amendment analysis, in other words, rested on the
cultural characteristics of television, not the technological ones.
The result: Pacifica's reasoning and jurisprudential approach are back.
This is disturbing.2°° The history of First Amendment decision making
in this century suggests that rules are more effective than ad hoc
analysis in protecting speech from the fears and repression of the
moment. Justice Breyer, in the Denver Area plurality opinion, attributed
his contextual approach to "the changes taking place in the law, the
technology, and the industrial structure," which, he said, made any
attempt to enunciate abstract doctrine premature.2 ' The deeper
message of the plurality opinion, though, is that no matter how
technology evolves, Pacifica's contextual approach - not the law of rules
- will continue to guide content-based regulation of media that feel like
television.
CONCLUSION
The plurality opinion in Denver Area emphasizes contextual, rather
than rule-bound, analysis, and offers a unique balancing answer to a
state action question. It makes sense when seen as a revival of Pacifica.
That the Court has brought back Pacifica, doctrinally and jurispruden-
tially, is a bit of a shock: while Pacifica's holding has remained good law
for the past eighteen years, the courts and FCC had given its reasoning
up for dead. The plurality Justices, though, focused on the cultural and
social similarities between cable and over-the-air television, and showed
no discomfort with ad hoc balancing analysis in the First Amendment
arena. The case suggests that contextual analysis will survive the demise
of the scarcity doctrine in communications law; its attraction goes deeper
than that.
200. The plurality's approach is not bad from the perspective of state action analysis;
it may even be salutary. But it is disturbing from the perspective of First Amendment law.
201. 116 S.Ct. at 2385; see also id. at 2401-03 (Souter, J., concurring).
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